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VACATUR OF ARBITRATION AWARDS: THE POOR LOSER
PROBLEM OR LOSER PAYS?
Stanley A. Leasure*
I. INTRODUCTION
The laudatory goals of the [Federal Arbitration Act] will be achieved on-
ly to the extent that courts ensure arbitration is an alternative to litiga-
tion, not an additional layer in a protracted contest. If we permit parties
who lose in arbitration to freely re-litigate their cases in court, arbitration
will do nothing to reduce congestion in the judicial system; dispute reso-
lution will be slower instead of faster; and reaching a final decision will
cost more instead of less. This case is a good example of the poor loser
problem and it provides us with an opportunity to discuss a potential so-
lution. 1
In B. L. Harbert International, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co.,2 decided in
February 2006, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the opportunity
to express its "exasperation" with the growing tendency of losing parties in
arbitration disputes to take a "never-say-die attitude" in the pursuit of vaca-
tur of arbitral decisions "without any real legal basis for doing so" and its
concern for the concomitant threat to the underlying purposes of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).3 Going further, the court gave a stern notice and
warning:
The notice [this opinion] provides, hopefully to even the least astute
reader, is that this Court is exasperated by those who attempt to salvage
arbitration losses through litigation that has no sound basis in the law
applicable to arbitration awards. The warning this opinion provides is
that in order to further the purposes of the FAA and to protect arbitration
as a remedy, we are ready, willing, and able to consider imposing sanc-
tions in appropriate cases. While Harbert and its counsel did not have the
* Stanley A. Leasure, J.D. is an assistant professor of Business Law at Missouri State
University. His twenty-five years of law practice in Fort Smith, Arkansas with the law firm of
Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C. included service as a mediator and arbitrator in litigated cases. He
is a certified civil mediator in Arkansas and is a member of the bars of Arkansas and Okla-
homa.
1. B.L. Harbert Int'l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907 (1lth Cir. 2006).
2. 441 F.3d 905 (11 th Cir. 2006).
3. Id. at 913, 914; 9 U.S.C. §1.
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benefit of this notice and warning, those who pursue similar litigation
positions in the future will.
4
Harbert has attracted national attention in the alternative dispute resolution
literature and in cases currently being litigated in state and federal courts
around the country. 5
Applying the Harbert "any real legal basis" requirement raises several
concerns that can be assuaged only by courts' commitment to focus on ba-
lancing two competing public policy goals: the need to protect the purposes
and benefits of arbitration under the FAA and the need to protect parties'
right to test the boundaries of the general rule that arbitration awards are
final. In Part II, this article examines the Harbert decision in detail, both
with respect to the underlying facts of the case and from the standpoint of its
legal underpinnings. Part III briefly examines the history of sanctions im-
posed in connection with attempts to vacate arbitration decisions pursuant to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Inasmuch as the analy-
sis of the efficacy of the sanctions proposed by the Harbert court hinges on
the "legal basis" for challenging arbitral decisions, the historical perspec-
4. 441 F.3d at 914.
5. See Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1262 (N.D. Ala. 2006); SII Investments, Inc. v. Jenks, No. 8:05-CV-2148-T-23 MAP, 2006
WL 2092639, at *3-5 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 27, 2006); Sheetmetal Workers' Int'l v. Law Fabrica-
tion, 459 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Polote Construction Co. v. Ziadeh,
No. 1:00-CV-263-GET, 2006 WL 2583292, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2006); Goeben v. Mor-
gan Stanley DW, Inc., No. 06-C-319, 2006 WL 2711802, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2006);
Puljic v. E.M. Rose Builders, Inc., No. NNHCV054016795, 2006 WL 2002384, at *1 (Conn.
Super. June 28, 2006); Malice v. Coloplast Corp., 629 S.E.2d. 95, 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006);
Lewis v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., No. 05-3383, 2006 WL 2701182, at *26-28, 35 n.19 (10th
Cir. Aug. 2, 2006); Sheeler v. O'Carrs Mgmt. Corp., No. 06-13137-GG, 2006 WL 2630042,
at *1, 16 (11th Cir. July 17, 2006); Campos v. City of Naples, No. 06-12713-13, 2006 WL
2629912, at *37 (1 lth Cir. June 30, 2006); FTN Financial Capital Mkts. v. Miller Johnson,
No. CV051770 PHX EHC, 2006 WL 1182744, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 10, 2006); PRM Energy
Sys., Inc. v. Primenergy, LLC, No. 04-6157, 2006 WL 1497745 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 7, 2006);
Strum v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 06-CV-290-PSF (MJW), 2006 WL 1407255 (D. Colo. Apr. 13,
2006); Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades, No. 06-10635
WGY, 2006 WL 1746316 (D. Mass. May 2, 2006); Meyer v. Edward Jones & Co., No. 06-C-
0491, 2006 WL 1830935 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2006); Jenelle Mims Marsh & Charles W. Gam-
ble, Alabama Law of Damages § 7:15 (5th ed. 2006); Construction Law Digest, § 29:20
(2006); Geri L. Dreiling, No Pity for "Poor Losers" 1 1th Circuit Threatens Sanctions for
Some Appeals of Arbitration Rulings, 5 No. 11 A.B.A. J.E-REPORT 2, (2006); David Seid-
man, Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 61-Jul Disp. RESOL. J. 93, 93 (2006); Don Zupanec,
Arbitration "Poor Losers" Face Sanctions, 21 FED. LITIGATOR 10, 10 (2006); Eric D. Dun-
lap, Setting Aside Arbitration Awards and the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 80-
Aug Fla. B.J. 51, (2006); Arbitration Sanctions for "Frivolous" Appeals of Arbitration
Awards, Nov. 2, 2006 N.Y.L.J. 3, col. 1, 3, Col. 1 (2006); Arbitration Developments and
Trends, SL081 AI-ABA 1643, 1648 (2006).
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tives underlying the purposes of the FAA, together with federal statutory
and common law limitations on vacatur of arbitral decisions are examined in
Part IV. Part V reviews Arkansas statutory and case law related to the vaca-
tion of arbitration awards. Finally, Part VI contains concluding thoughts and
recommendations regarding the appropriate use of sanctions in connection
with arbitration vacatur.
II. B.L. HARBERTINTERNATIONAL, LLC V. HERCULES STEEL COMPANY
This case came to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.6
It involved a construction dispute between Harbert and Hercules Steel, par-
ties to a contract under which Hercules was to supply steel to Harbert for the
construction of an office building for the Corps of Engineers.7 The arbitra-
tor, a former federal judge, entered an award with which Harbert was dissa-
tisfied. 8 Harbert filed a motion to vacate the award in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Alabama. 9 The district court denied
Harbert's motion to vacate the award and granted Hercules' motion to con-
firm it.'" Unwilling to quit, Harbert filed an appeal of the district court's
denial of its motion to vacate the arbitration award with the Eleventh Circuit
persisting in its contention that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the
law."
In 2000, the Army Corps of Engineers awarded Harbert a contract to
construct an office complex at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 12 Subsequently,
Harbert awarded Hercules a subcontract to supply steel fabrication and erec-
tion services in connection with the construction of the office complex. 3
The subcontract contained a binding arbitration clause, and the parties later
executed a separate arbitration agreement that recognized the FAA as con-
trolling. 4
Under the subcontract, Harbert was to issue a progress schedule, with a
copy to each subcontractor, and the work was to be done according to the
progress schedule.'" Subcontractors were liable for damages caused by fail-
6. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 909.
7. Id. at 907.
8. Id. at 908 n.1.
9. Id. at 909.
10. Id.
11. Id.






ure to complete the work on time under the project schedule.' 6 Neither the
progress schedule nor the project schedule was defined. 7
As it developed, Harbert created two schedules known as the 2000
schedule and the 3000 schedule; the 3000 schedule was designed to update
the Corps of Engineers, and the 2000 schedule was to manage the subcon-
tractors. ' 8 Neither of these schedules mentioned the subcontract. 9
A dispute arose between Harbert and Hercules over Hercules's comple-
tion of the work.20 The 2000 schedule called for earlier completion dates
than those listed in the 3000 schedule,2' and Hercules did not meet these
earlier deadlines.22 Hercules's beginning and ending dates were, however,
within the deadlines in the 3000 schedule.23 Consequently, Harbert stopped
payments to Hercules and demanded delay damages that exceeded the
amount due to Hercules under the subcontract.24 Hercules subsequently filed
a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association seeking
the balance due under its subcontract and other damages. 25 Harbert con-
tended that it was entitled to delay and other damages in its counterclaim in
the arbitration proceeding.26
The main disagreement in the arbitration proceeding involved whether
the 2000 or the 3000 schedule applied to Hercules. Hercules contended that
the 3000 schedule applied and that it met these deadlines. Its principal points
were (1) that the subcontract was ambiguous because it referred to progress
schedule and project schedule without any definition of either; (2) that the
subcontract should be interpreted in light of the implied element of reasona-
bleness in the contract; (3) that Harbert had abandoned the 2000 schedule
thereby authorizing the 3000 schedule; and (4) that Harbert was not given
notice of the 2000 schedule when the work began.27 "Harbert, on the other
hand, contended that the subcontract language unambiguously gave it com-
plete authority to set the schedule meaning that Hercules was bound by the
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 907.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 907-08.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 908.
24. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 908.
25. Id. The arbitration hearing occurred before the Honorable Frank H. McFadden, who
had formerly served as Chief Judge for the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama. Id. at 908 n. 1. The arbitration took a total of seven days, and the pro-
ceedings were not recorded by a court reporter. Id. at 908.
26. Id. at 908.
27. Id.
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2000 schedule., 28 Further, Harbert argued that the "2000 schedule was the
'progress schedule' referred to in the subcontract because it was the only
schedule ... issued to all subcontractors.,
29
On September 8, 2004, the arbitrator awarded Hercules $369,775, the
unpaid balance on its subcontract, plus interest.3 ° The arbitrator denied Har-
bert damages for delay.3 The arbitrator also denied Harbert's counterclaim
and denied both parties' claims for attorney's fees.32 After the arbitrator is-
sued this award, Hercules contended that the $369,775 was a scrivener's
error and requested that the arbitrator fix the amount to $469,775."3 Harbert
moved for clarification and modification of the award on the grounds that
the award did not contain the specificity that the parties agreed they
needed. 34 Further, Harbert requested that the arbitrator modify the award to
provide "enough discussion" to enable the parties to understand the result
and the arbitrator's reasons for granting or denying any item of damage.35
As a result, on October 18, 2004, the arbitrator issued a new order
modifying the $369,775 award to Hercules to $469,775.36 The arbitrator also
issued findings on six issues, including a finding that Hercules was bound to
the more generous 3000 schedule rather than the 2000 schedule and that
Harbert was entitled to no damages because its claim was based on the inap-
plicable 2000 project schedule.37 Harbert then filed a motion to vacate the
award in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ala-
bama, claiming "that the arbitrator's rationale reflected a manifest disregard
of the applicable law. '38 Hercules opposed that motion and moved that the
court confirm the award, pursuant to the provisions of 9 U.S.C. § 9.39
The district court denied Harbert's motion and granted the relief re-
quested by Hercules.4 ° The district court interpreted the arbitrator's award as
concluding that the reason Hercules did not breach the subcontract was be-
cause it was bound by the 3000 schedule and not the 2000 schedule.4' The
district court found no evidence of manifest disregard for the law, distin-
28. Id.
29. Id.





35. Id. at 908-09.







guishing the instant case from Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. 2 Ac-
cordingly, the district court entered judgment enforcing the arbitration
award. 43 Harbert was dissatisfied with the decision of the district court as it
had been with the arbitrator's decision, so it continued the battle by filing a
notice of appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.'
The court of appeals issued its opinion February 28, 2006.4' At the out-
set, the court staked out the parameters of its review and the presumptions
under which that review would be conducted.' The court noted that under
the FAA, the standard of review is strictly limited, and the FAA presumes
that an arbitration award will be confirmed. 47 Furthermore, deference is to
be given to the arbitrator's decision whenever possible. 4
Before proceeding with a discussion of the common law grounds for
setting aside an arbitration award, including manifest disregard for the law,
the court identified the four narrow bases for vacating an award under the
FAA, holding that none "are even remotely applicable in this case."' After
dismissing the statutory grounds set out in the FAA as inapplicable, the
court pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit recognizes three non-statutory
grounds for vacating an arbitration award: (1) if it is arbitrary and capri-
cious; (2) if enforcement of the award is contrary to public policy; and (3) if
the award was made in manifest disregard for the law.5"
The linchpin of Harbert's challenge was its claim that the arbitrator had
acted in manifest disregard for the law; therefore, the court analyzed this
basis for the vacatur of an arbitration award.5 The court began its discussion
42. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 909 (citing Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d
1456, 1461 (1 lth Cir. 1997)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 906.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 909 (citing Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190 (1lth Cir. 1995);
Lifecare v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 433 (1 1th Cir. 1995)).
48. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 909 (citing Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 682 (11th Cir.
1992)).
49. Id. at 909-10 n.2 (citing the statutory grounds for the vacation of an award set out at
9 U.S.C. § 10(a): (1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbeha-
vior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made).
50. Id. at 910 (citing Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992) (arbi-
trary and capricious); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n. Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 671
(1 th Cir. 1988) (contrary to public policy); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128
F.3d 1456, 1464 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (manifest disregard for the law)).
51. Id. at 910.
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with a declaration founded on its previous decision in Montes v. Shearson
Lehamn Bros.2 : "[t]his ground for vacating an arbitration award requires
clear evidence that the arbitrator was 'conscious of the law and deliberately
ignore[d] it."' 53 The court made it clear that the mere misinterpretation,
misstatement, or misapplication of the law is not enough.54
The Harbert court traced manifest disregard for the law as a basis for
overturning an arbitration decision back to the Montes case, noting that
Montes was the only case in which the Eleventh Circuit had ever found the
exceptional circumstances sufficient to satisfy the exacting requirements for
setting aside an arbitration award based on manifest disregard for the law
grounds.5 The fact situation that arose in Montes and that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit found supported appellant's claim that the arbitrator had manifestly
disregarded the law was unique to say the least.5 6 That case arose out of an
employment dispute about overtime pay controlled by the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) 7 The FLSA was clearly contrary to the position taken by
the employer; nevertheless, the attorney for the employer repeatedly urged
the arbitrator to disregard the FLSA and rule in favor of the employer based
on equitable considerations. On behalf of his client, the employer's attor-
ney argued "in this case this law is not right" and that "the law says one
thing. What equity demands and requires and is saying is another."59 The
employer's counsel asked the arbitrator, in no uncertain terms, not to follow
the law.60 In Montes, the arbitrator found in favor of the employer, and in the
award the arbitrator repeated the plea of the employer's attorney.6' Nothing
in the transcript of the proceedings or the award indicated that the arbitrator
had not responded to the urgings of the employer's attorney, but neither the
evidence nor the law supported the award.6 2
52. 128 F.3d 1456 (11 th Cir. 1997).
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Montes, 128 F.3d at 1461-62).
55. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 910. Furthermore, the court took the opportunity to mention
numerous Eleventh Circuit cases in which manifest disregard for the law was not found,
including University Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 304 F.3d 1331,
1338 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1223 (1 1th
Cir. 2000); and Scott v. Prudential Sececurites, Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 n.21 (11th Cir.
1998). Id.
56. Montes, 128 F.3d at 1458, 1462.
57. Id. at 1458.
58. Id. at 1459.
59. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 911.
60. Id. at 910-11.
61. Id. at 911.
62. Montes, 128 F.3d at 1461-62.
2007]
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In Montes, the Eleventh Circuit found that the arbitrator had acted in
manifest disregard of the law, emphasizing the rare nature of the circums-
tances in that case.63 The court in Harbert noted the following:
Four facts came together in Montes and will seldom recur: Those facts
are that: 1) the party who obtained the favorable award had conceded to
the arbitration panel that its position was not supported by the law, which
required a different result, and had urged the panel not to follow the law;
2) that blatant appeal to disregard the law was explicitly noted in the ar-
bitration panel's award; 3) neither in the award itself nor anywhere else
in the record is there any indication that the panel disapproved or re-
jected the suggestion that it rule contrary to the law; and 4) the evidence
to support the award is at best marginal. 64
The Harbert court identified Montes as the exception rather than the rule,
noting that in every other case decided in the Eleventh Circuit on the manif-
est disregard of the law issue, the arbitration loser was the loser in the Ele-
venth Circuit.65
The court then directed its attention to the arguments made by Harbert
in support of its contention that the arbitration award should be set aside as
in manifest disregard for the law.66 The court began with a rather scathing
attack on Harbert's position with the statement that "the facts of this case do
not come within shouting distance of the Montes exception.,, 67 Going fur-
ther, the court proclaimed the following:
There are arguments to be made on both sides of the contractual interpre-
tation issue, and they were made to the arbitrator before being made to
the district court and then to us. Even if we were convinced that we
would have decided this contractual dispute differently, that would not
be nearly enough to set aside the award.6 °
Finally, the court repeated the axiom so often used in connection with arbi-
tration appeals that a showing of manifest disregard of the law requires
something more than misinterpretation, misstatement, or misapplication of
the law.69 Accordingly, the Harbert court quoted with approval the follow-
ing language from Montes: "An arbitration board that incorrectly interprets
63. Id.
64. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 911 (citation omitted).
65. Id. (citing Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F.3d 1320,
1327 (1lth Cir. 2005); Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 304
F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1223
(11 th Cir. 2000); Scott v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 n.21 (11 th Cir. 1998)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. Id.
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the law has not manifestly disregarded it. It has simply made a legal mis-
take., 70 The court characterized Harbert's argument as an argument that the
arbitrator clearly erred and noted that even a showing of clear error is insuf-
ficient.7 Finding no evidence that the arbitrator had made a conscious and
deliberate decision to ignore the applicable law, the court concluded that it
could not find that the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard for the law.72
Harbert made two main arguments in support of its position.73 In sup-
port of one of its legal arguments, Harbert urged that "the contract is part of
the law the arbitrator must apply, so that any misapplication of the contract
is a misapplication of the law., 74 The court rejected this argument out of
hand on two bases: (1) "[t]he contract is not part of the applicable law" but
is the agreement to which the law is applied and (2) "errors of law are not
enough to justify setting aside an arbitration award.
75
Another argument Harbert made was based on dicta from the Eleventh
Circuit decision in University Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Con-
structors, Inc. 76 There, the arbitral dispute involved an alleged failure to
meet contractual deadlines.77 The arbitrators found in favor of the developer
and awarded lost rent for a period during which the project had been com-
pleted.78 The construction company contended the arbitrators had acted, in
this regard, in manifest disregard for the law. 79 The district court confirmed
the arbitration award, and on appeal the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
there had been no showing of manifest disregard for the law, reiterating its
rule that such a conclusion was predicated on the consciousness of the law
and the deliberate ignoring of it.80 However, Harbert seized on one sentence
of dicta in the University Commons decision: "Theoretically, we suppose,
the arbitrators' approach to the award of damages could be in disregard of
the law altogether, if it differed from the provisions of the contract.",8' Har-
bert argued that this dicta stood for the proposition that misinterpretation of
a contract could constitute a manifest disregard for the law.82 The Harbert
court rejected this contention:
70. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 911 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 911-12.









81. Id. at 913.
82. See Harbert, 441 F.3d at 913.
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This one sentence of speculative dicta in one footnote of one opinion
cannot plausibly be construed as setting out a rule of law-that misinter-
pretation of a contract may constitute a manifest disregard of the law.
That is especially true since such a rule would be contrary not only to the
holding and express rationale of University Commons, but also to the set-
tled Eleventh Circuit precedent which governed that decision. Under the
well-established law of this circuit, which we have already discussed, if
we believe that the arbitrator's approach differed from the provisions of
the contract, at most that only establishes the arbitrator erred, which is
not enough to conclude there was a manifest disregard of the law. 83
Finally, the Harbert court concluded that there was "no evidence that the
arbitrator decided the dispute on the basis of anything other than his best
judgment-whether right or wrong--of how the law applie[d] to the facts of
the case."
After so concluding, the court turned its attention to Harbert's conduct
in appealing the arbitration award, first to the district court and then to the
circuit court. 85 Beginning what could be described as a diatribe, the court
stated the goals and rationale behind the FAA, noting that the FAA "en-
dorses and encourages arbitration as an alternative to litigation. '86 Relieving
court congestion and encouraging a method of speedier and less costly dis-
pute resolution are the foundations for the pro-arbitration policy of the
FAA.87 The court summarized these goals and purposes and applied them to
the facts in this case as follows:
The laudatory goals of the FAA will be achieved only to the extent that
courts ensure arbitration is an alternative to litigation, not an additional
layer in a protracted contest. If we permit parties who lose in arbitration
to freely relitigate their cases in court, arbitration will do nothing to re-
duce congestion in the judicial system; dispute resolution will be slower
instead of faster; and reaching a final decision will cost more instead of
less. This case is a good example of the poor loser problem and it pro-




86. Id. at 906 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983); Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005);
Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11 th Cir. 2005)).
87. Id. (citing Caley, 428 F.3d at 1367 (quoting Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gute-
hoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1440 (11 th Cir. 1998); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125 n.2 (2001))).
88. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 907.
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And discuss a potential solution, the court did.8 9 In the concluding para-
graphs of the opinion, the court characterized Harbert's actions as depriving
Hercules and the judicial system of the benefits of arbitration, increasing
cost and causing delay, and wasting judicial effort at the district court and
court of appeals levels. 9 According to the court of appeals, by refusing to
quit in the face of certain defeat, Harbert had destroyed the promise of arbi-
tration as a meaningful alternative to litigation.9 Recognizing the fact that it
could not prevent losers in arbitration proceedings from filing appeals
"without any real legal basis for doing so," the court noted that it could dis-
courage such baseless litigation and promote the policies of the FAA
through the threat of sanctions.92
The court, however, allowed Harbert to escape sanctions under the cir-
cumstances of this case for three reasons listed by the court in reverse order
of importance: (1) the speculative dicta in University Commons; (2) Her-
cules's failure to move for sanctions (although the court noted that it could
apply these sua sponte); and (3) lack of opportunity for Harbert to have the
benefit of this warning.9 3 The Eleventh Circuit wanted a notice and a warn-
ing to emanate from its opinion. 94 That notice and warning were expressed
in no uncertain terms:
The notice ... hopefully to even the least astute reader, is that this Court
is exasperated by those who attempt to salvage arbitration losses through
litigation that has no sound basis in the law .... The warning ... is that
in order to further the purposes of the FAA and to protect arbitration as a
remedy we are ready, willing, and able to consider imposing sanctions in
appropriate cases. While Harbert and its counsel did not have the benefit
of this notice and warning, those who pursue similar litigation positions
in the future will. 95
The Harbert court did not cite any authority for its proclamation that
future litigants would face sanctions should they seek to overturn an arbitra-
tion award through the appellate process without a sound basis. However,
this is not the first case in which the issue has arisen and in which sanctions
have been meted out.96 In the following section of this article, the history
and basis of sanctions in arbitration litigation are discussed.




93. Id. at 914.
94. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 914.
95. Id.
96. See infra Part III; CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc. v. Office and Prof'l Employees Int'l Union,
Local 39, 443 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2006); Dominion Video Satellite v. Echostar Satellite
L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2005); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machin-
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SANCTIONS IN ARBITRATION VACATUR ACTIONS
As previously stated, Harbert is not the first case in which a court has
sanctioned, or has considered sanctioning, those who unsuccessfully seek to
vacate an arbitration award.97 Sanctions have been imposed in such cases
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This section of
the article explores a brief history of sanctions in the context of efforts to
vacate arbitration awards.
A. CUNA Mutual Insurance Social v. Office & Professional Employees
International Union
The Seventh Circuit dealt with the issue of sanctions in an arbitration
appeal in CUNA Mutual Insurance Society v. Office & Professional Em-
ployees International Union, Local 39,98 a case decided less than a month
after Harbert.9 9 That case arose as a result of a dispute between CUNA and
a labor union representing a number of its employees in Madison, Wiscon-
sin.' The underlying facts are relatively straightforward. CUNA decided to
outsource a number of its employees' positions over the objection of the
union."' The union filed a grievance, contending there was a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). 02 CUNA proceeded with the layoff
notices, and the union appealed the grievance to arbitration.0 3 CUNA con-
tended that the union's grievance was insufficient because it referred to pro-
visions of the collective bargaining agreement dealing with layoffs, which
"did not prohibit outsourcing and was not concerned with the underlying
causes of layoffs."'" CUNA further contended that the CBA did not address
the question of outsourcing.'°5 Accordingly, it was CUNA's position that the
arbitrator was without jurisdiction to address the challenge.0 6 Although
CUNA participated in the arbitration hearing, it did not waive its argument
that the arbitrator lacked authority to rule on whether its outsourcing was
ists & Aerospace Workers, District No. 8, 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986); Int'l Ass'n of Heat
& Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers, Local Union No. 6 v. Thermo-Guard, 814 F.2d 1192
(D. Mass. 1987).
97. See supra Part II.
98. 443 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2006).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 558.
101. Id. at 558-59.
102. Id. at 559.
103. Id.




VACATUR OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
violative of provisions not cited in the written grievance." 7 The arbitrator
found that the issue was properly before him and that CUNA, through out-
sourcing, had violated several provisions of the CBA.'0 8 The grievance was
sustained, and the arbitrator ordered "that the work be restored to the bar-
gaining unit."' 9
CUNA filed an action in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Wisconsin to vacate, inter alia, that portion of the arbitration
award holding that its outsourcing violated provisions of the contract." 0 The
union sought to uphold the arbitrator's decision and, in addition, Rule 11
sanctions. "' The parties stipulated that the district court could decide the
matter on cross motions for summary judgment. "12 The district court entered
its order finding in favor of the union on the merits and affirmed the Rule 11
sanctions against CUNA, awarding attorneys' fees of over $9000.' CUNA
appealed the imposition of the Rule 11 sanctions only." 4
The appellate court reviewed the sanctions issue under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard." 5 Using an objective standard to determine whether
CUNA or its counsel should have known that CUNA's position was ground-
less, the court concluded that the district court could impose sanctions if a
suit "is not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for [an] ex-
tension, modification, or reversal of existing law" or if it is not well
107. Id.
108. Id. at 559-60.
109. Id. at 560.
110. CUNA, 443 F.3d at 560.
111. Id. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an attorney present-
ing a pleading to the court certifies to the best of the attorney's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by ex-
isting law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or re-
versal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) the allegations and oth-
er factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further inves-
tigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on
the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of in-
formation or belief.
Violations of these strictures may result in sanctions against the offending party. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11 (b).
112. CUNA, 443 F.3d at 560.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarz Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); Corley v.
Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 388 F.3d 990, 1013-14 (7th Cir. 2004); Mars Steel Corp.
v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
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grounded in fact." 6 The court took into consideration "the long line of Se-
venth Circuit cases that have discouraged parties from challenging arbitra-
tion awards and have upheld Rule 11 sanctions in cases where the challenge
to the award was substantially without merit.""' 7 The court quoted with ap-
proval from Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers'18:
A company dissatisfied with the decisions of labor arbitrators need not
include an arbitration clause in its collective bargaining contracts, but
having agreed to include such a clause it will not be permitted to nullify
the advantages to the union by spinning out the arbitral process uncons-
cionably through the filing of meritless suits and appeals. For such con-
duct the law authorizes sanctions that this court will not hesitate to im-
pose. Mounting federal caseloads and growing public dissatisfaction
with the costs and delays of litigation have made it imperative that the
federal courts impose sanctions on persons and firms that abuse their
right of access to these courts .... Lawyers practicing in the Seventh
Circuit, take heed! 19
The court then discussed CUNA's claim of lack of arbitrability, con-
cluding that there was no true question of arbitrability, but rather CUNA
was "dress[ing] up its arguments about the scope of the arbitrator's authority
in arbitrability clothing."' 2 ° The court concluded that "[c]ase law could not
be more clear: courts should not overrule an arbitrator's interpretation of an
arbitration agreement unless 'there is no possible interpretive route to the
[arbitrator's] award, so a non-contractual basis can be inferred."""'
116. Id. at 560 (citing Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d
957, 963 (7th Cir. 1993)). In another argument rejected by the lower court, CUNA claimed
that the arbitrator erred by retaining jurisdiction to address damage issues, a claim that was
one of the reasons Rule 11 sanctions were imposed by the district court. The court concluded
that the case law was likewise clear on this issue and that CUNA's lawyers should have
known their position was groundless. Id. at 565 (citing Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 1993)).
117. Id. at 561 (citing Bailey v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 819 F.2d 690, 691 (7th Cir.
1987); Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1987); Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Clearing, 807 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1986); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District No. 8, 802 F.2d 247, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1986)).
118. 802 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1986).
119. CUNA, 443 F.3d at 561 (quoting Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 802 F.2d at 255-56).
120. Id. at 563.
121. Id. at 564 (citing Arch of Illinois v. District 12, United Mine Workers of Am., 85
F.3d 1289, 1293-94 (7th Cir. 1996)) (quoting Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi-
cago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1506 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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B. Dominion Video Satellite v. Echostar Satellite L.L. C.
The issue of sanctions was also addressed in a Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals case involving a dispute over a lease agreement, which was submit-
ted to arbitration.'22 Echostar lost at the arbitration hearing and was ordered
to pay Dominion almost $2.5 million in damages. 23 Dominion asked the
district court to confirm the award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 13, and
Echostar objected to the arbitral decision and the motion to confirm it in the
district court. 24 The district court confirmed the arbitration award and, pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, sanctioned counsel for Echostar for "unreasona-
bly and vexatiously extend[ing] the arbitration hearings and court proceed-
ings.' 25 Echostar was ordered to pay Dominion's costs, expenses, and attor-
ney's fees occasioned by the necessity to respond to Echostar's frivolous
motions.1 26 Echostar appealed the confirmation of the arbitrator's damage
award in favor of Dominion, and Echostar's attorneys appealed the award of
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. 27 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the district court on all counts.
28
On appeal, Echostar contended that the arbitral award against it should
be set aside on several grounds: federal preemption; violation of first
amendment freedom of expression; claim preclusion; doctrine of impossibil-
ity; lack of justiceability; and failure of the agreement to provide for damag-
es.' 29 The court noted that none of Echostar's contentions fit within the ru-
122. Dominion Video Satellite v. Echostar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir.
2005).
123. Id. at 1272.
124. Id.
125. Id. Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part:
"Any attorney... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatious-
ly may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attor-
neys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
126. Dominion, 430 F.3d at 1272.
127. Id.
128. Id. The appellate court began by declaring the standard of review of an arbitration
decision to be "among the narrowest known to law." Id. (quoting Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline
Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001)). It also set out the statutory basis for vacation of an
arbitration award under the FAA and under the common law basis of manifest disregard. Id.;
9 U.S.C. § 1 0(a)(4) (providing statutory grounds for vacation "in certain instances of fraud or
corruption, arbitrator misconduct, or 'where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so im-
perfectly executed them that a mutual, final, definite award upon the subject matter was not
made') (quoting Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932). Manifest disregard exists in cases of "willful
inattentiveness to the governing law" and where "arbitrators knew the law and explicitly
disregarded it." Dominion, 480 F.3d at 1272 (quoting ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45
F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1995)); Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932.
129. Id. at 1275. Echostar also requested that the arbitral decision be remanded for clarifi-
cation as to how the panel reached the damages figure. Id. at 1278. The appellate court con-
cluded that the cases Echostar relied on did not support the proposition that an arbitral panel
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bric of the FAA and, accordingly, must fall within the manifest disregard of
the law basis. 30 The court also pointed out that virtually all of these argu-
ments had been raised in and rejected by (1) the district court prior to arbi-
tration when Dominion requested a preliminary injunction; (2) the arbitra-
tion panel; and (3) the district court at the hearing on confirmation of the
arbitration award. 3 ' In almost summary fashion, the court dispatched with
each of Echostar's contentions because "Echostar cite[d] no controlling
precedent and it fail[ed] to identify any evidence. . . indicat[ing] . . . 'manif-
est disregard.'" 32 The Tenth Circuit concluded that Echostar's appeal of the
confirmation of the award was frivolous and invited Dominion to file a mo-
tion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
to recoup its attorneys' fees and costs.'33
The court then turned its attention to the contention by Echostar's at-
torneys that the 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions rendered against them in the
district court were baseless and violated their due process rights. 13 4 It
pointed out that attorneys have been called to answer for their conduct under
§ 1927 in a number of situations, such as where they have acted "recklessly
or with indifference to the law;', 135 "when an attorney is cavalier or bent on
misleading the court; intentionally acts without a plausible basis; [or] when
the entire course of the proceedings are unwarranted."' 36 Applying these
standards, the court rejected the attorneys' argument that they filed the vari-
must set forth its calculation of damages when the record provides adequate support for the
award. Id. at 1287.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1275-76.
132. Dominion, 430 F.3d at 1276. As to Echostar's First Amendment argument, the court
stated that "Echostar failed to provide relevant authority. . . failed to allege or point to any
evidence that the panel willfully ignored relevant First Amendment doctrine .... Id. As to
claim preclusion, the court stated that "[e]ven though the prior arbitration panel referenced a
provision of the Agreement at issue in this case, it did not decide any issues related to that
exception, nor was the reference invited by the parties or necessary to the resolution of the
prior dispute." Id. As to impossibility, the court stated that "Echostar's bare allegations,
which are not supported by the record, do not establish evidence in support of this contention
... " Id. at 1277. As to justiciablity, the court determined that "the concept of justiciability is
derived from Article III of the Constitution and limits the jurisdiction of federal courts. This
Court has found no controlling authority that mandates application of those limits in arbitra-
tion." Id. Finally, regarding damages the court concluded that "Echostar fail[ed] to provide
this Court with any evidence that in reaching [the] conclusion [that damages are recoverable
under the agreement] the panel disregarded the law or exceeded its power ... " Id.
133. Id. at 1278. Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides as fol-
lows: "If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately
filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just dam-
ages and single or double costs to the appellee." FED. R. App. P. 38.
134. Dominion, 430 F.3d at 1278.
135. Id. (citing Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1511 (10th Cir. 1987)).
136. Id. (citing Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1342 (10th Cir. 1998)).
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ous motions and briefs below only to preserve issues for appeal. 13 7 The court
found that the attorneys' conduct was both "unreasonable and vexatious"
and that the district court had not abused its discretion in finding their con-
duct sanctionable.'38 The court likewise dispatched with the attorneys' due
process argument and affirmed in full the sanctions issued against Echos-
tar's attorneys. 139
As discussed above, the Harbert court threatened and other courts have
imposed, sanctions against parties who have lost arbitral decisions and have
elected to attempt to set aside those decisions through litigation in the
courts. 40 The Eleventh Circuit has, in Harbert, expressed its intention to
attempt to stop this practice, at least insofar as it involves efforts to vacate
arbitration awards without a "real legal basis for doing so.""'' The following
two sections examine what constitutes a "real legal basis" for asking that an
arbitral award be set aside.
IV. VACATUR: FEDERAL STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW
A. Statutory Grounds for Vacatur Under the Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was passed by Congress in 1925 to
reverse the long-standing enmity of American courts toward the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements. 4 2 The FAA evinces a strong national policy
favoring arbitration as a mechanism to relieve congestion in the courts and
to provide a method of dispute resolution that is simpler, more expeditious
and less expensive than litigation. 141 Process efficiency has been historically
viewed as one of the chief attributes of the arbitral alternative established
137. Id. at 1279.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1280.
140. See supra Part II.
141. See supra Part II.
142. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001).
143. B. L. Harbert Int'l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 906 (11th Cir. 2006).
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995); Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 510-511 (1974); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
404 (1967); Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367 (1 lth Cir. 2005);
Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2001); Dobbins v. Hawk's Enters., 198
F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1999); see also S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67 Cong., 4th Sess. 2 (1923). Despite the long standing weariness
with which the courts viewed arbitration, the FAA was passed by Congress due to the "agita-
tion against the costliness and delays of litigation." H.R. Rep. No. 68-96 at 1-2 (1924). It
was designed to "reduc[e] technicality, delay and expense to a minimum and at the same time
safeguard [] the rights of the parties." Id.
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under the FAA.' In furtherance of this goal, the FAA provides for very
restricted judicial review of arbitration awards, with only four statutory
grounds for the vacatur of an arbitration decision: (1) the award was pro-
cured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) there was evident partiality
or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause shown, or refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the con-
troversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the sub-
ject matter submitted was not made. 41 While the FAA does provide statuto-
ry grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards, it "does not obliterate the hesi-
tation with which courts should view efforts to re-examine awards.' 46 In
this section of the article, the statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA
will be examined in light of the numerous cases in the federal courts con-
struing these provisions.
The FAA provides that in cases in which the award was "procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means," it may be vacated by the district court
upon application of any party. 147 The federal courts have taken a narrow
view in interpreting "undue means." This basis for vacatur connotes beha-
vior that is immoral, if not illegal.'41 In Conoco, Inc. v. Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers International Union, 49 the court noted that the facts giving
rise to the undue means must not have been discoverable by due diligence
prior to the arbitration and must be materially related to an issue in the arbi-
tration as established by clear and convincing evidence.' Vacation of an
arbitration award on this basis is appropriate only if the undue means relied
upon were outcome determinative.' 1 Furthermore, some courts have said
that inasmuch as the term undue means is combined with "fraud" and "cor-
ruption" in this ground for vacatur, there must be evidence of intentional
144. Steven L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 443, 499-500 (1998); Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, A.B.A.J.,
Mar. 1982, at 274, 276-277.
145. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(l)-(4) (2000 & Supp. 2001-2003).
146. Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594,
598 (3d Cir. 1968).
147. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2001-2003).
148. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCullough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1992).
149. 26F. Supp. 2d 1310 (N.D. Okla. 1998).
150. Id. at 1320 (citing Gingiss Int'l, Inc. v. Bornet, 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995));
see also Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (1 lth Cir. 1988).
151. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 967 F.2d at 1403; Forsythe Int'l S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of
Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 29
VACATUR OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
misconduct to constitute the requisite undue means.'52 The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals has held that "undue means.., include measures
equal in gravity to bribery, corruption, or physical threat to an arbitrator; no
court has ever suggested that the term 'undue means' should be interpreted
to apply to submission of evidence that is merely legally objectionable."' 53
Similarly, most courts have been reluctant to vacate an arbitration
award on the statutory basis of fraud.'54 More than a mere showing of fraud
is necessary. It must be demonstrated that there was a connection between
the fraud and the arbitration decision. 55 The predicate to vacation of an arbi-
tral award on grounds of fraud has been explained as follows: (1) the fraud
must be materially related to an issue in the arbitration; (2) the fraud must
not have been discoverable with due diligence prior or during the arbitra-
tion; and (3) the fraud must be established by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 56 Fraudulent conduct brought to the attention of the arbitrator prior
to his decision does not constitute fraud sufficient to justify overturning the
award.157 Also, the requisite fraud has been found absent where a party con-
sented to arbitration only after one of the witnesses gave perjured testimony,
if the witness's testimony was not considered by the arbitrators.'
One seeking to set aside an arbitration award on the basis of evident
partiality has the heavy burden of establishing facts that indicate an impro-
per motive on the part of the arbitrator." 9 The standard for a finding of evi-
dent partiality adopted by the Second Circuit in Morelite Construction Corp.
v. New York City District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,'60 that the evi-
dence must clearly show that an arbitrator was partial to one of the parties,
152. PaineWebber Group, Inc. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P'ship, 187 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.
1999).
153. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 52 F.3d 359,
362 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
154. Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 990 (1982); Conoco, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
155. Forsythe, 915 F.2d at 1022.
156. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004); MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Int'l Bhd. Of Elec.
Workers Local 499, 345 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2003); OR. Sec., Inc. v. Prof I Planning
Assocs. Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 748 (11 th Cir. 1988); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835
F.2d 1378, 1383 (1 lth Cir. 1988).
157. ABC Int'l Trades, Inc. v. Fun 4 All Corp., 79 F. App'x 346, 348 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting A.G. Edward & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1992))
("[Wihere fraud... is not only discoverable, but discovered and brought to the attention of
the arbitrators, a disappointed party will not be given a second bite at the apple.").
158. Terk Techs. Corp. v. Dockery, 86 F. Supp. 2d 706, 709-10 (E.D. Mich. Div. 2000).
159. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir.
1993).
160. 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984).
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has been widely adopted. 6' In determining partiality, an objective standard
is used. It must be shown that a reasonable person would have to conclude
that the arbitrator was partial to one of the parties.'62 The hurdle facing one
who seeks to set aside an arbitration award on the basis of evident partiality
has also been described as follows: "[T]he interest or bias.., must be direct,
definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or spe-
culative." '163 It must be so great as to evidence bias and prejudice sufficient
to "destroy fundamental fairness" of the arbitration proceeding. "6 Therefore,
partiality must be more than a mere appearance of bias. '65
Federal courts have declined to find partiality sufficient to set aside an
arbitration award in the following circumstances: prior business relationship
between arbitrator and party's law firm;.66 arbitrators were in the business of
collecting debit balances from customers and arbitration award pierced cor-
porate veil of entities to hold individual liable for debit balances;167 attorney-
arbitrator's undisclosed scheduling dispute with law firm representing one
of the parties to arbitration proceeding; 168 and arbitrator's prior service as an
expert witness for a party to the arbitration. 169 Evident partiality sufficient to
set aside an arbitration award was, however, found where the arbitrator's
son was an officer of a union, which was a party to the arbitration. 170 The
Eighth Circuit, in Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. '
1
held that the arbitrator's position as a high ranking officer of a company for
which Merrill Lynch had served as underwriter of numerous bond issues
161. Id. at 84; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 645
(6th Cir. 2005); JCI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42,
51 (1st Cir. 2003); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir.
1999); Montes v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 2001); Gianelli Money
Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11 th Cir. 1998).
162. Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989).
163. Tamari v. Bache Halsey Stuart Inc., 619 F.2d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1980); see also
United States Wrestling Fed'n v. Wrestling Div. of AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313, 318 (7th Cir.
1979).
164. Catz Am. Co. v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exch., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 549, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); see also Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397
F.2d 594, 600 (3d Cir. 1968); Ballentine Books, Inc. v. Capital Distrib. Co., 302 F.2d 17, 21
(2d Cir. 1962).
165. Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1984).
166. Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 982 (8th Cir. 2001).
167. Scott v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017-18 (11 th Cir. 1998).
168. Lifecare Int'l, Inc. v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 434-35 (11th Cir. 1995), opinion
modified and supplemented, 85 F.3d 519 (1996).
169. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Tatung Co., 379 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2004).
170. Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds,
748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984).
171. 51 F.3d 157 (8th Cir. 1995).
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(which relationship was non-disclosed) was likewise sufficient to establish
evident partiality requiring the vacation of an arbitration award. 1
72
An arbitration award may also be vacated under the FAA "where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced."'' 73 These grounds for the vacatur have
been construed to require a showing that the misconduct was serious and
"amount[ed] to a denial of the fundamental fairness of the arbitration pro-
ceedings."'' 74 Furthermore, it must be demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that the aggrieved party was not able to fully present its case,
175
and bad faith or gross error typically must be shown to establish the requi-
site misconduct. 1
76
The exclusion of evidence by the arbitrator will be sufficient to sustain
the grant of a request to vacate an arbitration decision only if it "so affects
the rights of a party that it may be said that he was deprived of a fair hear-
ing.' ' 177 This requires a showing of more than an error of law. 78 Given the
fact that arbitrators have considerable procedural discretion in the adminis-
tration of an arbitration hearing and in refusing to allow evidence, it must be
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that a party was prejudiced
by not being able to fully present its case. 79 The court in Storey v. Searle
Blatt Ltd.'80 identified the reason behind the rule of limited review of a de-
termination of whether the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in denying
a request for adjournment, noting that the expeditious resolution of a dispute
is one of the principal benefits of arbitration.'' "'[I]nstances when an arbi-
172. Id. at 160. For other cases in which courts have found "evident partiality," see also
Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (failure to disclose prior representation
by arbitrator's law firm on numerous occasions); Middlesex Mutual Insurance Co. v. Levine,
675 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (11th Cir. 1982) (undisclosed dispute between arbitrator's family
company and party to the arbitration).
173. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2001-2003).
174. Transit Casualty Co. v. Trenwick Reinsurance Co., Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 1346, 1354
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516 Int'l Union,
500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974).
175. Roe v. Cargille Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 808, 815 (W.D. Ark. 2004).
176. Bisnoff v. King, 154 F. Supp. 2d 630, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Agarwal v.
Agarwal, 775 F. Supp. 588, 589 (S.D.N.Y., 1991); United Paperworkers Int'l. v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 40 (1987)).
177. Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594,
599 (3d Cir. 1968).
178. Id.
179. Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 822 (8th Cir.
2001); see also Roe v. Cargill, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 808 (W.D. Ark. 2004).
180. 685 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
181. Id. at 82.
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trator's procedural aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct'
are 'very rare."" 82 Additionally, as the court in Marshall & Co. v. Duke'83
held, "[t]his statutory basis for vacatur does not, however, invite hindsight
evaluations of the correctness of the judgment of an arbitration panel in
managing the presentation of evidence during an arbitration.'
184
Interestingly, concerns regarding the mental capacity of an arbitrator
cannot rise to the level of misconduct and, therefore, are beyond examina-
tion. In Gearhardt v. Cadillac Plastics Group, Inc.,85 the losing party in an
arbitration proceeding resisted an action to confirm the arbitration award
and, also, sought to obtain post-award discovery related to the physical and
mental condition of the arbitrator. 8 6 The party that came out on the short
end of the arbitration claimed it had reasonable cause to believe the arbitra-
tor was suffering from a mental disability during the arbitration hearing such
as senile dementia or another neurological or brain disorder.'87 The court
refused to permit discovery into the arbitrator's mental health, concluding
that even if he were suffering from a mental disease or defect, that would
not be misconduct cognizable under 9 U.S.C. § 10(c). '8
Another statutory basis for vacatur arises when the arbitrator exceeds
his powers or so imperfectly executes them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matters was not made.8 9 As with the preceding
grounds for vacatur, this basis is difficult to establish under federal case law.
The United States Supreme Court held in United Paperworkers Internation-
al Union v. Misco, Inc.'90 that "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his au-
thority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice
to overturn his decision."' 9 ' The issue regarding an arbitrator exceeding his
or her powers in such a way as to support the vacation of an arbitration
award has typically been found only in situations where the arbitrator mod-
ifies or changes the parties' contractual obligations. 9 2 Similar to the ap-
proach taken by many courts in connection with the common law "irratio-
nality" basis for setting aside an arbitral award discussed below, many
182. Holmes v. Nat'l Football League, 939 F. Supp. 517, 524 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (quoting
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968)).
183. 941 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
184. Id. at 1211.
185. 140 F.R.D. 349 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
186. Id. at 350.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 352.
189. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2000).
190. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
191. Id. at 38.
192. Western Employers Ins. Co. v. Jefferies & Co., 958 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1992);
see Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982).
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courts have interpreted this statutory ground to include situations in which
the arbitrator has gone beyond the "essence" of the arbitration agreement.
93
This provision of the FAA has also been applied in circumstances where the
arbitrator fails to meet his obligations as specified in the contract of the par-
ties.' 94 However, only in situations in which it is clear that the arbitrator
went beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration will the award be set
aside. 9' For instance, an award of relief against someone not a party to the
arbitration agreement would constitute an act in excess of an arbitrator's
powers, such as to justify judicial action to rectify the award. 96 In addition,
if the arbitrator decides issues not presented by the parties, the award must
be vacated.'97 As noted in Shahmion Industries, Inc. v. United Steelworkers
ofAmerica, AFL-CIO:'"
It is, of course, elementary that an arbitrator may not decide matters out-
side of the issues submitted for arbitration. But it is only when the arbi-
trator clearly goes beyond the scope of the submission that the courts
will interfere. Every presumption is in favor of the award's validity, and
the person challenging an award has the burden of showing that the arbi-
trator exceeded his authority.' 
99
Legal or interpretive errors, however, do not equate to the arbitrator
exceeding the powers granted him in the arbitration agreement. 20 0 The courts
have been very clear that this ground for vacatur does not include situations
193. See, e.g., Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 384 n.8 (5th Cir.
2004); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Marketing Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir.
2005); Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Eur. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 37 F.3d 345, 349 (7th Cir.
1994); Pacific Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1024 n.2
(9th Cir. 1991); Kelley v. Michaels, 59 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 1995); Kanuth v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1179-81 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany
Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1130 n.1 1 (3d Cir. 1972).
194. Id. at 261; see Western Can. S.S. Co. v. Cia. De Nav. San Leonardo, 105 F. Supp.
452 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
195. FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1994); Textile Workers of
Am., AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 1386 v. Am. Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 896 (4th Cir.
1961); see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, 74 F.2d 533, 536 (4th Cir.
1935); Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. United Cas. Co., 142 F.2d 390 (1st Cir.
1944).
196. Lefkovitz v. Wagner, 395 F.3d 773, 778 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing BEM I, L.L.C. v.
Anthropologie, Inc., 301 F.3d 548, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2002); Lindland v. United States Wres-
tling Ass'n, Inc., 227 F.3d 1000, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000); Katz v. Feinberg, 290 F.3d 95, 97-98
(2d Cir. 2002); Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2000)).
197. Dighello v. Busconi, 673 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Conn. 1987) (citing United Steelwork-
ers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)).
198. Shahmoon Indus., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 263 F. Supp. 10
(D.N.J. 1966).
199. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
200. Long John Silver's Rests., Inc. v. Cole, 409 F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 n.3 (D.S.C. 2006).
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in which the arbitrator fails to correctly interpret the law, misinterprets the
underlying contract, fails to specify reasons for the decision, or fails to state
conclusions of law. °l
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, the judicial interpreta-
tions of the grounds enumerated in the FAA for vacating an arbitration
award demonstrate the great deference provided to such awards.02 The court
in Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. noted that in the consideration of
the vacatur of an arbitration award, the courts should proceed along the
"slender and carefully defined path" set out in the FAA in its narrow statuto-
ry provisions and only upon a finding of no arbitral misconduct as described
by the FAA may the court begin its determination as to whether one of the
few common law grounds for arbitration vacatur exists.0 3 In the next section
of this article, those judge-made exceptions to the finality of arbitral deci-
sions are discussed.
B. Judicially Crafted Grounds for Vacatur
In addition to the statutorily created grounds for vacatur of an arbitra-
tion award, the courts have crafted a limited number of common law
grounds that, when satisfied, will justify vacatur of arbitral awards.2" Most
jurisdictions recognize "manifest disregard of the law," and some have
adopted "contrary to public policy," "irrational," and "arbitrary and capri-
cious" as grounds for vacatur.2 °5
1. Manifest Disregard for the Law
Manifest disregard of the law has been frequently used in attempts to
set aside arbitration awards.20 6 Reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard,
201. Maidman v. O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25, 27-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Arbitration
Between Andros Compania Maritima & Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 704 (2d Cir. 1978);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); Kurt
Orban Co. v. Angeles Metal Sys., 573 F.2d 739, 740 (2d Cir. 1978).
202. Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 496, 499-500 (M.D. Fla.
1992) (citing O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof I Planning Assoc., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11 th Cir. 1988)).
203. Id. at 503.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 194 (manifest disregard of the law); 213-17
(irrational); 219-26 (contrary to public policy); 227-32 (arbitrary and capricious).
205. Lawrence R. Mills, J. Lani Bader, Thomas J. Brewer & Peggy J. Williams, Vacating
Arbitration Awards, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2005, at 23.
206. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 8 n.4, John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Patten, 127 S. Ct.
434 (2006) (No. 0649) sets forth the following: "Westlaw searches show that, since 2000
alone, there have been at least 400 decisions in the District Courts addressing 'manifest dis-
regard,' as a ground for vacating arbitration awards. Of the 197 cases ruling on the issue in
the courts of appeals, more than seventy percent were decided in the last decade. At least four
more published appellate decisions . . . have issued since the petition was filed." Id. The
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this basis for vacatur requires a showing that the arbitrator knew the law and
explicitly disregarded it.27 Importantly, the "manifest disregard" standard
does not apply to the factual findings of the arbitrator, which are not review-
able.0 8
The Second Circuit has developed a two-pronged test to determine
whether an arbitrator is guilty of manifestly disregarding the law with both
objective and subjective components.2 9 Under this test, the court first de-
termines whether the governing law is "well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable."2 ' Then, the court attempts to determine whether the arbitrator
recognized the clearly governing principle and chose to ignore it.211 Only if
both elements of the test are met has there been a manifest disregard of the
law. 2 Often in connection with claims that an arbitrator manifestly disre-
garded the law, it is pointed out that judicial review of arbitral decisions is
significantly limited:
Review of an arbitrator's award is severely circumscribed. Indeed, the
scope of review of an arbitrator's valuation decision is among the nar-
rowest known at law because to allow full scrutiny of such awards would
frustrate the purpose of having arbitration at all-the quick resolution of
disputes and the avoidance of the expense and delay associated with liti-
gation.213
Respondents Brief in Opposition at 8 n.1, John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Patten, 127 S. Ct.
434 (2006) (No. 06-49), identifies the following federal cases from each of the circuits recog-
nizing manifest disregard as a common law basis for vacatur of an arbitration award: Cytyc
Corp. v. DEKA Prods. Ltd. P'ship, 439 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2006); Hofet v. MVL Group,
Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2003); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003);
Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1998); Sarofim
v. Trust Co. of the West, 440 F.3d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir. 2006); Solvay Pharms., Inc. v. Du-
ramed Pharms., 442 F.3d 471, 475 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006); Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes,
975 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1992); McGrann v. First Albany Corp., 424 F.3d 743, 749 (8th Cir.
2005); Carter v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2004); Dominion Video
Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005); Peebles v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 431 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11 th Cir. 2005); Kurke v.
Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc., 454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc.,
238 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
207. Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985).
208. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 1999).
209. Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2002).
210. Id.
211. Id.; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930,
934 (2d Cir. 1986).
212. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998); DiRussa v. Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997); Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v.
Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1993).
213. Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. United States Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4th
Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
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Similarly, the Fourth Circuit recognizes that one claiming manifest dis-
regard shoulders the "heavy burden" of demonstrating that the arbitrator was
aware of the law, understood it, found it applicable, and chose to ignore it in
making the arbitral decision.214 The Eighth Circuit has concluded that the
standard for vacatur of an arbitration award based on manifest disregard is
"narrow" and limited to situations in which the arbitrator clearly identifies
the governing law and then ignores it.215 In St. John's Mercy Medical Center
v. Delfino,216 the court characterized the doctrine of manifest disregard of the
law as "a doctrine of last resort reserved for those exceedingly rare instances
where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent,
but where none of the provisions of the FAA apply."
217
In an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case decided in July
2006, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado was faced
with a claim that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law set out in
a prior federal court case.215 There, the court noted the following: "Unfortu-
nately May is of little persuasive guidance, as it rejects the theory out of
hand without analysis, observing only that 'Plaintiffs have absolutely no
legal support for this assertion.""'2 9 Accordingly, the one case cited by the
movant seeking vacatur of the arbitral decision did not amount to manifest
disregard of the law.220
The Seventh Circuit has limited the application of the principle to cases
in which the arbitration award requires the parties to violate the law or fails
to "adhere to the legal principles specified by contract."2 1 However, the
manifest disregard of the law standard has been consistently distinguished
from misinterpretation, misstatement, or misapplication of the law.
222
The First Circuit, in a case decided September 19, 2006, found manif-
est disregard of the law when an arbitral panel used the word "irrelevant" in
determining the inapplicability of New Hampshire wage law to a compensa-
214. Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 149 (4th Cir. 1994); Upshur Coals
Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991); San Mar-
tine Compania De Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir.
1961).
215. Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2001); Roe v. Cargill, Inc., 333
F. Supp. 2d. 808, 814 (W.D. Ark. 2004).
216. 401 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005).
217. Id. at 884 (citing Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2004)).
218. Morrill v. G.A. Wright Marketing, Inc., No. 04-CV-01744-MSK-BNB, 2006 WL
2038419 (D. Colo. July 18, 2006).
219. Id. at *2.
220. Id. at *2-3.
221. George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F. 3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citing Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000)).
222. Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (11 th Cir. 1997).
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tion plan dispute. 23 The court held that the use of "irrelevant" by the panel
evidenced an intent to "set aside the governing law in favor of its perception
of an equitable result and industry practices" in concluding that an employee
was not protected by the wage laws because he had participated in a compa-
ny stock plan and had voluntarily agreed to its terms.224
2. Contrary to Public Policy, Irrational, and Arbitrary and Capri-
cious
Another sometimes-recognized basis for vacatur is that the award is
"completely irrational.2 25 In analyzing the rationality test, some courts have
focused on whether the award "draws its essence" from the agreement.226 An
award is considered drawn from the essence of the agreement if it is, in fact,
derived from the agreement in light of its language, context, and other indi-
cia of the parties' intention.22 ' Additionally, irrationality has been found in
cases in which there is no evidence to support the arbitrator's award, 2 8 and
failure to decide the arbitration proceeding in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the law has also been construed as "fundamentally irration-
al., 229 The courts are quick to point out that a mere error of the law or failure
of the arbitrator to understand and apply the law is not sufficient. 3°
Some courts have determined that the vacation of an arbitration award
is appropriate if it is contrary to public policy, but the requisite "public poli-
cy" must be "well defined and dominant" as determined "by reference to the
223. McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 89-90 (1st Cir. 2006).
224. Id. at 90. Interestingly, however, in reviewing the district court's actions with respect
to a second decision by the same arbitral panel, the First Circuit ruled that the district court
had erred in finding that the arbitral panel likewise evidenced manifest disregard for the law
in that award since the district court conducted its own legal analysis into the second arbitral
award rather than limiting its examination to the record for manifest disregard of the law. Id.
225. Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972).
226. Roe v. Cargill, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 808, 814 (W.D. Ark. 2004); Cytyc Corp. v.
DEKA Products Ltd. P'ship, 439 F.3d 27, 32-33 (lst Cir. 2006); McGrann v. First Albany
Corp., 424 F.3d 743, 749 (8th Cir. 2005).
227. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper-Allied Indus., Chemical & Energy Workers (PACE),
Local 7-0159, 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2002).
228. NF&M Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 524 F.2d 756, 760 (3d Cir. 1975);
H.K. Porter Co. v. United Saw, File & Steel Products Workers of Am., 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir.
1964).
229. San Martine Compania De Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d
796, 801 n.4 (9th Cir. 1961).
230. Cytyc Corp. v. DEKA Products Ltd. P'ship, 439 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2006);
McGrann v. First Albany Corp., 424 F.3d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 2005); Roe v. Cargill, Inc., 333
F. Supp. 2d 808, 813 (W.D. Ark. 2004); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper-Allied Indus., Chemi-
cal & Energy Workers (PACE), Local 7-0159, 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2002); NF&M
Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 524 F.2d 756, 759 (3d Cir. 1975).
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laws and legal precedents. 23' It must be shown that the enforcement of the
arbitration award would violate such a public policy. 23 2 The Tenth Circuit
expressed the public policy grounds as follows:
[T]he public policy exception provides an additional basis for reversing
an arbitration award where the terms of the arbitration contract, either
expressly or as interpreted by the arbitrators, violate public policy or
where the award requires parties undertake some action in violation of
public policy. The decision to reverse an award must be based on "expli-
cit conflict with other 'laws and legal precedents' rather than an assess-
ment of 'general considerations of supposed public interests. ,233
This exception to the general rule that decisions of the arbitrator are fi-
nal traces its roots to the maxim that the courts are not bound to enforce
illegal contracts. 234 However, this basis for vacatur is also very limited:
This exception is narrow. The mere fact that "general considerations of
supposed public interests" might be offended by an arbitral award is not
enough to make the exception available .... Rather, the award must vi-
olate an "explicit ... well defined and dominant" public policy, as ascer-
tained "by reference to.. . laws and legal precedents.
235
As with all of the common law exceptions, the courts have not exer-
cised this power broadly.236 In Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc. ,237
the First Circuit was instructive in the methodology to be used to determine
whether an arbitral award contravenes public policy:
231. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987); see also
LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Banco de Seguros
del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2003); Bob Schultz Motors,
Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 334 F.3d 721, 724 n.2 (8th Cir. 2003).
232. United Food & Commercial Workers' Union Local No. 655 v. St. John's Mercy
Health Sys., 448 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)).
233. Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifles, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012 n.l (10th
Cir. 1994) (citing United Paper Workers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42-44
(1987); Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1993)); see also
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n of the
Int'l Bhd. of Elect. Workers, 861 F.2d 665, 671 (11 th Cir. 1988); Iowa Elec. Light & Power
Co. v. Local Union 204, 384 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
234. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n, 429 F.3d 338, 343 (1st Cir. 2005)
(citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Lino-
leum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
235. Id. at 343 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 795, Int'l Union of the United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
236. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Tennessee Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d
510, 520 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
237. 118 F.3d 841, 846 (1st Cir. 1997).
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To determine whether a particular case fits within the confines of this
class, courts must employ a two-tiered analytic approach. First, since a
generalized sense of public policy provides an insufficient basis upon
which to annul an arbitral award, an inquiring court must review existing
statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions to ascertain whether they es-
tablish a well defined and dominant public policy. If positive law does
not give rise to such a policy, then the inquiry is at an end. If, however,
the court finds that such a policy exists, it must proceed to the second
step of the pavane and determine whether the arbitral award clearly vi-
olates the discerned public policy.
238
Another common law exception applies to arbitrary and capricious
awards.239 In the Eleventh Circuit, arbitration awards are considered arbi-
trary and capricious if the "award exhibits a wholesale departure from the
law"24 or if a legal "ground for the arbitrator's decision cannot be inferred
from the facts.",24' An attack on an arbitration award on the grounds that it is
arbitrary and capricious is a high hurdle indeed inasmuch as the award is
presumed to be correct and will be set aside only under circumstances in
which there is no ground whatsoever to support it.24 2 This judicially created
basis for the setting aside of an arbitral award is founded on the presumption
that arbitration agreements "do not grant arbitrators carte blanche, so federal
courts have the power to vacate awards that are arbitrary or capricious....
His award must have 'foundation in reason or fact.'
' 243
Several things are readily apparent from the foregoing discussion of the
statutory grounds for vacatur and those judicially created. They are viewed
narrowly, with great reluctance shown in implementing them. They must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, and there must be a nexus
between the establishment of one of these statutory grounds and the arbitra-
tion decision. Errors of law or fact are never enough. The difficulty in estab-
lishing one of these statutory grounds for vacatur is surmounted only by that
necessary to establish one of the common law bases, and the scope of re-
view is characterized as "among the narrowest known at law" in light of the
public policy favoring arbitration as a means of quick and cheap dispute
238. Id. at 846 (citation omitted).
239. See infra text accompanying notes 230-34.
240. Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 781 (11 th Cir. 1993).
241. Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1413 (11th
Cir. 1990).
242. Sullivan, Long & Hagarty, Inc. v. Local 559 Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 980
F.2d 1424, 1427 (11 th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 781
(1lth Cir. 1993).
243. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Helpers & Food Processors, Local Union
657 v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 735 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Int'l Ass'n of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, District No. 145 v. Modem Air Transport, Inc., 495 F.2d
1241, 1244 (5th Cir. 1974)).
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resolution.2' These grounds are accepted only as a last resort for truly
unique and rare circumstances. With the foregoing overview of the federal
statutory and case law regarding vacatur of arbitral decisions, the next sec-
tion of this article examines the same issues from the standpoint of Arkansas
statutory and case law.
V. VACATUR IN ARKANSAS
The Arkansas Uniform Arbitration Act (AUAA) was passed by the Ar-
kansas General Assembly in 1969.245 The statutory grounds for vacatur of an
arbitration award under the AUAA differ slightly from those of the FAA.
The Arkansas act contains five grounds on which the vacation of an arbitra-
tion award is appropriate:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights
of any party; (3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) the arbitrators
refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown there-
for or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise
so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of § 16-108-205, as
to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or (5) there was no arbi-
tration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in the pro-
ceedings under § 16-108-202 and the parties did not participate in the ar-
bitration hearing without raising the objection.246
The AUAA also specifically provides that no grounds exist for the vacation
of an arbitration award on the basis that the relief granted could not or
would not be awarded by a court.247
The arbitral process is, without question, favored in Arkansas. 248 In
construing both the FAA and the AUAA, the Arkansas courts have recog-
244. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1275
(11 th Cir. 2005).
245. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to -224 (LEXIS Repl. 2006). "When the underlying
dispute involves interstate commerce, the FAA, instead of the AUAA, applies." Lehman
Properties, Ltd. P'ship v. BB&B Const. Co., 81 Ark. App. 104, 108, 98 S.W.3d 470, 473
(Ark. App. 2003); see also Pest Mgmt., Inc. v. Langer, No. 06-748, 2007 WL 538178 (Ark.
Feb. 22, 2007); PRM Energy Sys., Inc. v. Primenergy, L.L.C., No. 04-6157, 05-6061, 2005
WL 3783414, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 15, 2005); Walton v. Lewis, 337 Ark. 45, 49, 987
S.W.2d 262, 265 (Ark. 1999); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
281 (1995).
246. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-212(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2006). Arkansas Code Annotated
section 16-108-212 is based upon section 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (1955). See
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, MASTER EDITION Volume 7, Pt. I.
247. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-212(a)(5)(B) (LEXIS Repl. 2006).
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nized the strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution that is faster and cheaper than the litigation process, with the add-
ed benefit of reducing congestion in the courts.2 9 The scope of judicial re-
view in arbitration cases has been determined, to be "very narrow" 250 be-
cause under Arkansas law, the courts are to construe an arbitration award,
when possible, to uphold its validity.25' As the Arkansas Supreme Court has
noted, "[I]n the interest of avoiding time-consuming and costly litigation,
arbitration is not a perfect system. Our scope of review is very narrow, li-
mited to vacating an award only upon statutory grounds or a finding that the
award violates a strong public policy.
252
The court's task with respect to "undue means" does not include eva-
luating whether the evidence at the arbitral hearing was inappropriate or
inadequate, but rather focuses on the fairness, or lack thereof, of the decision
or decision-making process and whether that process went beyond what was
contemplated by the AUAA. 253 Furthermore, procedural irregularities in the
proceedings can be waived and a party may be estopped from raising them if
that party contributes to the irregularities.254
In Arkansas Department of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers,
Inc.,255 the Arkansas Supreme Court had the opportunity to construe "undue
means" in a case in which the Arkansas Department of Parks and Tourism
had declined to renew the lease of DeGray State Park Lodge to Resort Man-
agers.256 The decision not to renew the lease gave rise to several disagree-
ments between the parties, which they agreed to submit to binding arbitra-
248. Slusser v. Farm Serv., Inc., 359 Ark. 392, 401, 198 S.W.3d 106, 112 (2004); Leh-
man Props., L.P. v. BB&B Const. Co., 81 Ark. App. 104, 110, 98 S.W.3d 470, 474 (2003).
249. Pest Mgmt., Inc. v. Langer, No. 06-748, 2007 WL 538178 (Ark. Feb. 22, 2007);
Lancaster v. West, 319 Ark. 293, 299, 891 S.W.2d 357, 361 (1995); Hart v. McChristian, 344
Ark. 656, 662, 42 S.W.3d 552, 556 (2001); May Const. Co. v. Thompson, 341 Ark. 879, 888,
20 S.W.3d 345, 351 (2000); Showmethemoney Check Cashers v. Williams, 342 Ark. 112,
119 27 S.W.3d 361, 365 (2000); Cash in a Flash Check Advance of Ark., L.L.C. v. Spencer,
348 Ark. 459, 466, 74 S.W.3d 600, 604 (2002).
250. ESI Group, Inc. v. Brown, 90 Ark. App. 6, 10, 203 S.W.3d 664, 667 (2005) (citing
Hart v. McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 42 S.W.3d 552 (2001)).
251. 200 Garrison Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Crawford Constr. Co., 53 Ark. App. 7, 9, 918
S.W.2d 195, 196 (1996); Chrobak v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 46 Ark. App. 105, 109, 878
S.W.2d 760, 762 (1994) (citing Ark. Dep't of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294
Ark. 255, 260, 743 S.W.2d 389 (1988)).
252. Hart v. McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 666-67,42 S.W.3d 552, 559 (2001).
253. Ark. Dep't of Parks & Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255, 260, 743
S.W.2d 389, 391 (quoting Seither & Cherry Co. v. Illinois Bank Bldg. Corp., 95 I11. App. 3d
191,419 N.E.2d 940 (1981)); Chrobak, 46 Ark. App. at 110, 878 S.W.2d at 763.
254. Chrobak, 46 Ark. App. at 111, 878 S.W.2d at 763 (citing Gibbons v. United Transp.
Union, 462 F. Supp. 838, 842 (E.D. Ill. 1978); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d
1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990)).
255. 294 Ark. 255, 743 S.W.2d 389 (1988).
256. Id. at 256, 743 S.W.2d at 389.
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tion.257 The arbitrators ruled in favor of the Department, awarding it substan-
tial damages against Resort Managers. 8 Taking a laissez faire attitude to-
ward the arbitration, Resort Managers declined to present any evidence at
the arbitration hearing and failed to challenge the Department's evidence
and damage calculations.259 After the adverse ruling at the arbitration, Resort
Managers filed suit in chancery court seeking to modify the arbitration
award.26" The Chancellor vacated the award, finding that the Department had
used undue means to obtain the award by misrepresenting monies spent for
recarpeting, cleaning, and painting.261 The Department appealed the vacation
of the award to the Arkansas Supreme Court.262 The reviewing court deter-
mined that, although some mistakes in fact had occurred, there was no evi-
dence of fraud, corruption or undue means, or other basis to set aside the
award and accordingly reversed the decision of the trial court.2 63 In so doing,
it noted that Arkansas public policy strong favors arbitration as a mechanism
for resolving disputes."
In Hart v. McChristian,265 the Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed much
of the law on arbitral appeals.266 In that case, the basis of the dispute was a
Limited Liability Partnership Agreement (LLPA) entered into between the
parties, particularly, the removal of general partners under a mechanism
created by the LLPA.267 The Harts were the general partners, and McChris-
tian was a limited partner.268 McChristian sought to remove the Harts as
general partners pursuant to the provisions of the LLPA based on allegations
of their improper conduct. McChristian filed suit in Washington County
Chancery Court seeking, inter alia, an order requiring the parties to submit
to arbitration should the Harts object to their removal as general partners.269
The Harts contended that because McChristian held only eighteen percent of
the partnership the arbitration was precluded, but the trial court ordered the
parties to submit to arbitration. 270 The arbitrators found in favor of McChris-
tian and ordered the removal of the Harts as general partners. 271 The arbitral
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 257, 743 S.W.2d at 390.
260. Id. at 256, 743 S.W.2d at 389-90.
261. Ark. Dep 't of Parks & Tourism, 294 Ark. at 256, 743 S.W.2d at 390.
262. Id. at 256, 743 S.W.2d at 390.
263. Id. at 259, 743 S.W.2d at 389.
264. Id., 743 S.W.2d at 391.
265. 344 Ark. 656, 425 S.W.3d 552 (2001).
266. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 552.
267. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 552.
268. Id. at 660, 42 S.W.3d at 555.
269. Id. at 661, 42 S.W.3d at 555.
270. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 555.
271. Hart, 344 Ark. at 661, 42 S.W.3d at 556.
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award was confirmed by the chancery court, and the Harts filed motions to
amend or vacate the award and the Chancellor's order confirming it.2" In
connection with these motions, the Harts reiterated their standing and proce-
dural arguments, but the chancery court entered judgment confirming the
award pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-108-214, and the
Harts appealed.273
In their first point for appeal, the Harts contended that the trial court
erred in compelling arbitration under the LLPA.274 In rejecting this argu-
ment, the court determined that such agreements addressed the strong Ar-
kansas public policy favoring arbitration and determining, in light thereof,
that such agreements are not to be construed strictly, but rather read to in-
clude arbitration topics within the spirit of the agreement resolving doubts in
favor of arbitration.275
McChristian further contended that there were procedural defects in the
arbitration, including the arbitrator's failure to keep a record and follow the
rules of evidence.276 These, he contended, constituted grounds for vacating
the award.277 The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected these procedural argu-
ments, ruling that recordation of the proceeding is not required and the fail-
ure to follow evidentiary rules is, likewise, not grounds for vacatur of an
arbitration award. 278 The court noted, "Our review is limited to vacating an
award only upon the enumerated statutory grounds, unless the award is viol-
ative of a strong public policy.
279
In Anthony v. Kaplan,28° a dispute arose between KPMG and a former
partner regarding his termination.28 ' An arbitration hearing was held, and the
arbitrators found that KPMG had complied with the partnership agreement
in terminating Anthony. Anthony moved to vacate the arbitral decision in
federal court, which was denied.282 The genesis of this lawsuit was Antho-
ny's claim that his attorney in the arbitration proceeding had committed
malpractice.283 In determining whether the attorney committed malpractice,
the Arkansas Supreme Court was required to determine whether the award
272. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 556.
273. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 556.
274. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 556.
275. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 556.
276. Id. at 669, 42 S.W.3d at 560.
277. Hart, 344 Ark. at 669, 42 S.W.3d at 560.
278. Id., 42 S.W.3d at 560 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Deislinger, 289 Ark.
248, 711 S.W.2d 771 (1986)).
279. Id. at 668, 42 S.W.3d at 560.
280. 324 Ark. 52, 918 S.W.2d 174 (1996).
281. Id. at 55, 918 S.W.2d at 175.
282. Id., 918 S.W.2d at 176.
283. Id., 918 S.W.2d at 176.
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should be vacated on statutory grounds or as violative of public policy.284
The court determined that the award was not subject to vacatur and, in doing
so, quoted with approval McElroy v. Waller,285 which it characterized as
setting out general principles.
The fact that parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration implies
an agreement to be bound by the arbitration board's decision, and every
reasonable intendment and presumption is in favor of the award; it should
not be vacated unless it clearly appears that it was made without authority,
or was the result of fraud or mistake, or misfeasance or malfeasance. Unless
the illegality of the decision appears on the face of the award, courts will not
interfere merely because the arbitrators have mistaken the law, or decided
contrary to the rule of established practice as observed by courts of law and
equity.
286
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Deslinger,287 a party dissatisfied with
an arbitral decision appealed, contending that the arbitrators excluded cer-
tain evidence that would have been admitted in court. 288 The Arkansas Su-
preme Court determined that this did not rise to the level of the statutory
ground of partiality: "[I]t is well established that the interest, partiality, or
bias which will overturn an arbitration award must be certain and direct, and
not remote, uncertain or speculative., 289 And in Lancaster v. West,290 the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that bare allegations of partiality on the part
of arbitrators are insufficient, rejecting the appellant's claim of partiality of
the arbitral board on "her belief that certain arbitration panel members were
not impartial" without more.29'
In ESI Group, Inc. v. Brown,292 the Arkansas Court of Appeals was
faced with a claim by the loser at an arbitration hearing that the arbitrator
had exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement. 293 ESI had purchased
stock in a corporation from the Browns, and a controversy arose as to
whether the Browns had misrepresented the earnings of the corporation in
284. Id. at 56-58, 918 S.W.2d at 176-77 (citing Stifle Nicholaus & Co. v. Francis, 872
S.W.2d 484 (1994); Maross Const. Inc. v. Cent. N.Y. Reg'I Transp. Auth., 488 N.E.2d 67;
Lieberman v. Lieberman, 149 Misc. 2d 983,566 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Supp. 1991)).
285. 1 Ark. App. 292, 731 S.W.2d 789 (1987).
286. Anthony v. Kaplan, 342 Ark. 52, 59, 918 S.W.2d 174, 178 (1996) (quoting McLeroy
v. Walker, 21 Ark. App. 292, 295, 731 S.W.2d 789, 791 (1987)); see also Chrobak v. Edward
D. Jones & Co., 46 Ark. App. 105, 878 S.W.2d 760 (1994) (citing Alexander v. Fletcher, 206
Ark. 906, 175 S.W.2d 196 (1943); Kirten v. Spears, 44 Ark. 166 (1884)).
287. 289 Ark. 245, 711 S.W.2d 771 (1986).
288. Id. at250, 711 S.W.2d at 771.
289. Id. at 251, 711 S.W.2d at 772 (quoting 56 A.L.R.3d 697 (1973)).
290. 319 Ark. 293, 891 S.W.2d 357 (1995).
291. Id. at 300, 891 S.W.2d at 361.
292. 90 Ark. App. 6, 203 S.W.3d 664 (2005).
293. Id. at 6, 203 S.W.3d at 666.
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question.294 ESI contended that they had and argued that the purchase price
for the stock should be adjusted accordingly.295 The parties settled their dis-
pute and executed a settlement agreement, which called for the preparation
of audited financial statements to be used, pursuant to a formula, to calculate
a price adjustment, subject to a floor and ceiling amount.296 The settlement
agreement contained an arbitration clause by which disputes "concerning"
the settlement agreement would be resolved by binding arbitration.2 97 The
Browns, dissatisfied with the preparation of the audited financial statements
and the resultant price adjustment, filed suit contending, inter alia, breach of
contract.2 98 At ESI's request, the court referred the claim to arbitration at
which ESI contended that the arbitrator's power was limited to a determina-
tion of the breach of contract claim in the Brown's lawsuit.299 The Browns,
on the other hand, contended that the arbitration covered any issue related to
the settlement agreement."' The arbitrator agreed with the Browns, conclud-
ing that any dispute concerning the settlement agreement was subject to
arbitration; therefore, the arbitrator decided issues in the dispute in addition
to the breach of contract claim brought by the Browns against ESI.301 ESI
moved for reconsideration by the arbitrator and persisted in its contention
that the arbitrator erred in resolving any matter other than the breach of con-
tract claim in the original circuit court complaint brought by the Browns.
302
The arbitrator denied the motion for reconsideration, and ESI filed a motion
in circuit court to vacate the arbitration award, claiming it exceeded the
scope of the arbitration.3 3 The trial court denied that motion, and ESI ap-
pealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals.3°
The Arkansas Court of Appeals began its analysis by pointing out that
the scope of appellate review is very narrow and that an arbitral award may
be vacated only upon statutory grounds or a finding of a violation of strong
public policy.305 The court identified its task as being to construe the arbitra-
tion award, if possible, to uphold its validity and to uphold the award absent
a clear showing that it was made without authority or as a result of fraud,
mistake, misfeasance, or malfeasance. 306 The court felt bound to give effect
294. Id. at 8, 203 S.W.3d at 665.
295. Id., 203 S.W.3d at 665.
296. Id., 203 S.W.3d at 665.
297. Id. at 9, 203 S.W.3d at 665.
298. ESI Group, 90 Ark. App. at 9, 203 S.W.3d at 665.
299. Id., 203 S.W.3d at 666.
300. Id., 203 S.W.3d at 666.
301. Id., 203 S.W.3d at 666.
302. Id. at 10, 203 S.W.3d at 666.
303. Id., 203 S.W.3d at 666.
304. ESI Group, 90 Ark. App. at 10, 203 S.W.3d at 667.
305. Id., 203 S.W.3d at 667.
306. Id. at 11, 203 S.W.3d at 667.
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to the parties' contract." 7 However, it held that the arbitration agreement
would not be strictly construed, but rather it would be construed to include
subjects within the spirit of the agreement, resolving ambiguities regarding
intent or scope in favor of arbitration." 8 With those guideposts, the court
concluded that even if part of the arbitral award dealt with compensation
due under a non-competition agreement rather than solely the settlement
agreement, that the award "concerned the settlement agreement" and was
therefore the proper subject of arbitration as within the spirit of the arbitra-
tion agreement.30 9 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
vacate the arbitral award.310
With the foregoing discussion of the historical perspectives underlying
the purposes of the FAA and the statutory and common law limitations on
vacatur of arbitral decisions established in the federal courts as well as those
in Arkansas, and the analysis of the Harbert decision and other federal cases
in which sanctions have been applied, the question remains, where do we go
from here? The Harbert court has unmistakably thrown down the gauntlet
insofar as the Eleventh Circuit is concerned, and based on the multitude of
articles and cases citing and discussing this case, it is apparent that numer-
ous other courts have been, and will continue to be, urged to adopt the
stance taken in Harbert. In the next, and concluding, section of this article,
the future ramifications of Harbert will be discussed as well as the wisdom,
or lack thereof, of harsh sanctions to those who deign to challenge arbitra-
tion awards and lose.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In Harbert, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did four things: (1) it
identified what it called the "poor loser problem," defined by that court as
arising when the losing party in arbitration refuses to quit and seeks relief
from the arbitration award without a good basis for doing so; 31 (2) it charac-
terized the poor loser problem as a threat to the underlying goals of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act to reduce congestion and provide a quicker and cheaper
alternative to the litigation system;3 12 (3) it expressed its exasperation with
this problem;3 13 and (4) it identified a potential solution, the threat of sanc-
307. Id., 203 S.W.3d at 667.
308. Id. at 11-12, 203 S.W.3d at 667.
309. Id. at 12, 203 S.W.3d at 668.
310. ESI Group, 90 Ark. App. at 12, 203 S.W.3d at 668.
311. B.L. Harbert Int'l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 907, 913 (11th Cir.
2006).
312. Id. at 907.
313. Id. at914.
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tions, to attempt to discourage this practice.3 14 What the court failed to do
was identify exactly how the practitioner representing a losing party at arbi-
tration is to make the determination, prior to launching the vacatur process,
whether there is, in fact, "any real legal basis for doing so. '315 In reaching its
conclusion that Harbert had pursued vacatur without an appropriate legal
basis, the court relied on a number of arbitration bromides: judicial review
of arbitration awards is narrowly limited; 16 deference is to be given to the
arbitration award;3"' and manifest disregard of the law must be shown by
clear evidence.
18
In assessing the wisdom of pursuing vacatur of an arbitration decision,
one must, no doubt, consider the standards of the law of arbitration vacatur
discussed above. There is, without a doubt, a strong policy both nationally
and in Arkansas favoring arbitration as a mechanism to relieve congestion
and expedite the resolution of disputes in an economical fashion. 319 Addi-
tionally, judicial review of arbitration awards is quite narrow 320 in that the
court will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the arbitrator,
and mere errors of law or fact are insufficient to set aside an arbitration
award.32' Most of the statutory and common law bases for setting aside an
arbitration award must be shown by clear and convincing evidence,322 and
grounds that are uncertain or speculative are insufficient.323 With respect to
the frequently asserted grounds of undue means or fraud, the courts have set
rigorous standards requiring a showing of intent or culpability and a demon-
stration that the conduct was outcome determinative.324 Procedural irregular-
ities, standing alone, are seldom enough. 325 Also, claims that the arbitrator
exceeded his power or imperfectly executed it are rarely successful.326 Ac-
cordingly, based on the foregoing, it is clear that in Arkansas and elsewhere
a bleak picture has been painted for one considering an attempt to vacate an
adverse arbitration decision.
This pessimism is supported by a study presented in April 2005 at the
American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution's Seventh Annual
Conference, which was the subject of a recent article entitled Vacating Arbi-
314. Id. at913-14.
315. Id. at 913.
316. Id. at909.
317. Harbert, 441 F.3d at 909.
318. Id. at910.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 194, 195,209, 222.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 106, 109, 185, 196, 197, 198, 224, 228,247.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 137, 154, 155, 179, 199,230.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 116, 121, 134, 150, 230.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 123, 125, 188.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 112, 113, 114, 115.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 74, 140.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 81, 147, 148, 149, 154.
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tration A wards.32 7 Mills, et al., analyzed 182 reported state and federal cases
decided in 2004 in which vacatur of an arbitration award had been re-
quested. 28 In these 182 cases, the parties seeking vacatur of the arbitration
award raised 277 grounds for vacatur. 29 Of these 277 grounds, only fourteen
percent were successful. 330 The following is a breakdown from the Mills
study showing the success rates of the various grounds of vacatur asserted in
the subject cases:
Ground Attempted Vacated % Successful
Corruption/Fraud 13 1 7.7
Refused postponement 12 2 16.7
Manifest disregard 52 2 3.8
Refused evidence 24 3 12.5
Evident partiality 33 4 12.1
Misbehavior 42 7 16.7
Exceeded powers 101 21 20.8
Total 277 40 14.4331
The aforementioned results are not particularly surprising given the
numerous and substantial hurdles the Federal Arbitration Act, its state coun-
terparts, and the common law have placed on vacatur of arbitration awards.
Mills, et al. concluded, "In general, our sample confirmed once again how
very difficult it is in the real world for parties to obtain vacatur of an
award., 332 It is not overstatement to characterize these hurdles as nearly in-
surmountable. However, with the Harbert decision, the cost of challenging
an arbitral award has gone up, and assuming the logic of Harbert is accepted
in other federal and state courts, the risk of being wrong is significant. With
Harbert's logic, "poor losers" may be accurate in more than one sense of the
term as a result of the imposition of monetary sanctions. How will counsel
for these losers advise their clients, and how will those clients, both sophis-
ticated and unsophisticated, make these decisions?
The aforementioned cases from the federal courts and Arkansas, when
combined with the results of the Mills study, lead inescapably to the conclu-
327. Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, DIsp. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2005.
328. Id. at 24.
329. Id. at 23.
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sion that in the vast majority of cases, an attempt to vacate an arbitration
award will be unsuccessful. In light of that, how can it be said, absent the
most extreme and unusual circumstances, that such an attempt has any "real
legal basis"? The Harbert decision may thwart all but the most intrepid. The
question almost boils down to whether, in this context, the courts want to
adopt a "loser pays" rule, when, in fact, the party seeking the vacatur of an
arbitration award is almost always the loser.
The lessons to be learned from Harbert are simple and at least facially
appealing. The Harbert court, and other courts that ultimately adopt the
same logic, are concerned about degradation of the arbitration process by
the usually unsuccessful, but multitudinous, attempts to have arbitration
awards judicially vacated. They see the harm, not from the ultimate success
of the challenges because as can be seen, most are unsuccessful, but from
the challenges themselves. Under this view, the parties and the legal system
are denied the significant benefits of arbitration if attacks on arbitration
awards, except in the most compelling circumstances, are permitted to go
unchecked. It is hoped that the threat of significant sanctions will thwart
vacatur actions that do not have an objectively identifiable and substantial
legal basis. The Harbert court struck the balance between reducing the
number of vacatur actions and discouraging meritorious vacatur contests in
favor of the former.
However, the Harbert logic raises some concerns. Much of the case
law in the vacatur area is very fact intensive. The courts in these cases tend
to spend a great deal of effort analyzing the specific fact situation. From the
practitioner's standpoint, such fact-based decisions are sometimes difficult
to apply to the case at hand. Another problem arises in states such as Arkan-
sas thath do not have a large body of law dedicated to the vacatur issue.
While the Arkansas courts do have a number of cases dealing with this is-
sue, none have been located addressing the imposition of sanctions in con-
nection with unsuccessful attempts to vacate arbitration awards. Further-
more, most of the Arkansas cases rely on general principles of arbitration
law and presumptions in connection with the review of arbitration decisions
rather than on the specifics of the statutory grounds for vacating arbitration
awards. Several have never been addressed at all.
In addition, the case law related to judicially crafted exceptions to the
general rule that arbitration awards are final is not well developed in Arkan-
sas. Therefore, the task put to one considering an attempt to vacate an arbi-
tration award in Arkansas or other states with limited arbitration jurispru-
dence, under the standard set out in Harbert ("real legal basis"), may not be
so simple. It is true that the Arkansas Supreme Court and other state courts
have stated that when faced with issues previously undecided in this area,
they will rely upon decisions from other jurisdictions, but which jurisdic-
tion? As discussed above, there is variance in the law related to the stan-
dards for vacating arbitration awards.
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As has been pointed out, parties to arbitration agreements are there by
choice and, if they do not desire to accept the finality of arbitration deci-
sions, they are free to refrain from entering into these agreements.333 Cer-
tainly that is true, but as a favored means of dispute resolution, it would
follow that the national policy favoring arbitration includes the notion that
the more parties willing to participate in this process, the better. In that vein,
it is appropriate to consider the effect of the Harbert ruling, if widely
adopted, on the willingness of "high volume" participants in the arbitration
process to continue to participate in that process.
Given the fact that the vast majority of such motions for vacatur will be
unsuccessful, the author anticipates that in Arkansas, and elsewhere, re-
quests for sanctions under the Harbert rule will accompany virtually every
response to a motion to vacate an arbitral award. The task of courts pre-
sented with such motions will be to balance two competing, and important,
public policy goals: the need to protect the underlying purposes and benefits
of arbitration against the rights of parties to test the limits of the general rule
that arbitration awards are final. The deftness with which the courts are able
to strike this balance will soon become apparent.
333. See, e.g., CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc. v. Office & Prof 1 Employees Int'l Union, Local 39,
443 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2006).
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